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 ‘The Multi-option Referendum: international guidelines, international practice 
and practical issues’ 
 
Stephen Tierney, Professor of Constitutional Theory, School of Law, University of 
Edinburgh and Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law 
 
10 August 2012 
 
Background 
This is a paper prepared by Stephen Tierney on 10 August 2012 and sent to the 
Scottish Government Head of Elections Team, Mr Stephen Sadler. On 5 July 2012 
Professor Tierney accepted an appointment to offer objective and independent advice 
to the Scottish Government on the process-related issues covered in the consultation 
paper (Your Scotland, Your Referendum)
1
. 
 
In the course of this commission he agreed to submit occasional papers to the Scottish 
Government in response to specific requests for information in light of international 
best practice on the technicalities of, and practicalities surrounding, referendum 
practice. This is in the end the only paper which he submitted to the Scottish 
Government. 
 
This Memorandum is written by Stephen Tierney in a personal capacity and not from, 
or on behalf of, the University of Edinburgh. 
 
In this Memorandum Professor Tierney offers no view as to the legal competence of 
the Scottish Parliament to pass a bill in relation to the holding of a referendum on 
constitutional change. He also offers no personal view as to whether or not the 
holding of a multi-option referendum would be an appropriate way to help determine 
Scotland’s constitutional future.  
 
                                                 
1
 Scottish Government Consultation Paper, January 2012. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Memorandum offers an account of the practical issues surrounding the framing 
of a two question referendum in the broader context of multi-option referendums in 
general: 
 
o A multi-option referendum presents voters with more than two options 
addressing the same issue, each of which is distinctive, leading to one 
outcome. (Section 1 below) 
 
o Multi-option referendums are very rarely used. (Section 2) 
 
o Binary referendums are widely believed to offer a simpler means of decision-
making. (Section 2) 
 
o Multi-option referendums tend to be used where the issue facing a polity 
points to more than two options each of which commands significant levels of 
support. (Section 2) 
 
o Non-binding international guidelines concerning good practice in referendums 
have been issued by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. These 
contain recommendations on good practice applicable to the setting of 
referendum questions for either a binary or multi-option referendums. Multi-
option referendums are neither expressly endorsed nor objected to by the 
Venice Commission guidelines. (Section 3) 
 
o There are four main models of multi-option referendums that have been used 
internationally (Section 4): 
 The ‘run-off’ model using two referendums 
 The plurality model with no ‘50% plus’ majority threshold 
 The gateway, filter and run-off model over two referendums 
 The gateway and final decision model in one referendum 
 
o Another possible model which has not been widely used is: 
 Preferential voting in one referendum with a model of proportional 
decision-making.  
 
o The following principles are used to assess the different methods of decision-
making by way of a multi-option referendum: the facilitation of active 
participation by citizens; the facilitation of public reasoning and deliberation; 
and the maximisation of collective consent among assenters and satisfaction 
with the process among dissenters. (Section 5) 
 
o In terms of these principles the gateway, filter and run-off model over two 
referendums (as used in New Zealand) seems to have worked well in filtering 
a number of options greater than three down to two for a final decision. 
(Section 5) 
 
o There are a number of models based upon the gateway and final decision 
model that offer different ways of determining a three option issue by way of 
two questions in one referendum. (Section 6) 
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Three such models are assessed in the Memorandum (Section 6):  
 Model A: the Change/No Change Gateway Model;  
 Model B: the ‘Knock-out’ Model; and  
 Model C: the Preferential Model 
 
All three models A-C would ensure that, to be successful, a model of 
constitutional change must win over 50% support in a binary vote against 
either the status quo or another option for change. It seems that models A and 
C would each be more likely than Model B to arrive at an outcome where it 
can be concluded with reasonable certainty that the winning option is 
preferred to the two other options by a majority of voters.  
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Introduction 
In a letter from the First Minister dated 20 July 2012 I was informed that the Scottish 
Government would like to give further consideration to the mechanics of how a two 
question referendum would work in practice. The letter sought my advice on ‘the 
practical arrangements for the operation of such a referendum’ confirming that this 
advice ‘will be separate from the testing of the actual question or questions to be 
proposed by the Scottish Government.’  
 
This Memorandum offers an account of a two question referendum in the broader 
context of multi-option referendums in general, looking to the practicalities involved 
in staging a multi-option referendum, and in doing so addressing the following 
questions and issues: 
 
1. What is a multi-option referendum? 
 
2. The multi-option referendum in context 
 
3. International Normative Guidelines 
 
4. International Practice: situations where the multi-option referendum has been 
used 
 
5. Assessing the different methods of decision-making by way of a multi-option 
referendum 
 
6. Assessing how a decision might be reached in a three option/two question 
referendum 
 
 
 
1. What is a multi-option referendum? 
In a multi-option referendum voters are presented with more than two options 
addressing the same issue, each of which is distinctive, leading to one outcome. This 
can be distinguished from other multi-question referendums where the voters are 
offered a number of binary votes on different issues leading to multiple decisions. 
 
2. The multi-option referendum in context 
The use of the referendum in processes of constitutional change has expanded greatly 
in the past three decades. It has been estimated that of the 58 functioning electoral 
democracies with a population of more than three million, 39 had conducted at least 
one national referendum between 1975 and 2000.
2
 The number of countries using 
referendums for the first time and the number of referendums occurring at sub-state 
level has also continued to grow to the present day. Despite this period of 
proliferation, multi-option referendums are very rarely used. The vast majority of 
referendums offer a binary choice between two options. This method offers a simpler 
means of decision-making than a multi-option poll. The general preference for binary 
                                                 
2
 Lawrence LeDuc, The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective (Broadview 
Press 2003) 29.  
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choice referendums might also explain how little focus we find on multi-option 
referendums within international normative guidelines (see Section 3).  
 
Despite the general preference for binary referendums, arguments can be found for 
multi-option referendums. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 
concluded in a report in 2010: ‘We recommend that the presumption should be in 
favour of questions posing only two options for voters but recognise that there may be 
occasions when multi-option questions are preferable.’3 In general we are more likely 
to find support for a multi-option referendum where the issue facing a polity points to 
more than two options commanding significant levels of support. As John Curtice 
observed in evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish 
Affairs: a ‘referendum is less likely to resolve an issue if it fails to encompass (and 
specify fairly) what are widely regarded as all of the key policy alternatives.’4 
 
There are notable cases where the multi-option referendum has been used (see 
Section 4). In some of these situations it is widely considered to have worked 
generally successfully; in others its use has been more problematic. In Section 4 I will 
address the main international precedents focusing upon the mode of decision-making 
in these referendums. In Section 5 I will analyse the main decision-making options 
available in multi-option referendums before focusing specifically on the two question 
model in Section 6. An Executive Summary is set out above. 
 
3. International Normative Guidelines 
Over the past decade international guidelines for good practice in referendums have 
begun to emerge. However, these guidelines have very little to say about multi-option 
referendums specifically. In particular, multi-option referendums are neither expressly 
endorsed nor objected to by the Venice Commission regime ((ii) below). Of course 
the guidelines issued by the Venice Commission are not legally binding on member 
states of the Council of Europe but they do carry the mandate of the Council and 
member states are expected to comply with these principles.  
 
(i) Background 
With the proliferation of the referendum in central and eastern Europe in the early 
1990s the Council of Europe has been active in establishing guidelines for good 
electoral practice.  
 
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has been specifically engaged in 
this process and has published guidelines specific to the referendum. Two documents 
are particularly significant. First, the ‘Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at 
National Level’5 were issued in 2001 (‘the 2001 Guidelines’). This document 
prescribes good practice in a number of areas, and as the title suggests these 
guidelines are specific to the context of constitutional referendums. The areas covered 
                                                 
3
 ‘Referendums in the United Kingdom’, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Report 
with Evidence, HL Paper 99, para 159. 
4
 House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Report: The Referendum on Separation for 
Scotland’, HC 1608, 2010-12. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/1608/1608we20.htm 
(NB: This was not and should not be read to be explicit support by Professor Curtice for a three option 
referendum on Scotland’s constitutional future.) 
5
 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Guidelines for 
Constitutional Referendums at National Level’ (11 July 2001) COE Doc CDL-INF(2001)10. 
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include: the legal framework; the procedural and substantive validity of texts 
submitted to a referendum; the franchise; fairness of the vote; funding, advertising 
and the media; and quorum rules. A second document, the Code of Good Practice on 
Referendums (‘the 2007 Code’), was adopted by the Venice Commission at its 70th 
plenary session in March 2007.
6
 This document covers referendums more generally.  
 
The 2007 Code itself contains a set of ‘Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums’. 
As such there is considerable crossover with the 2001 Guidelines. It is particularly 
notable that the 2007 Code also includes recommendations on compliance with 
international law.
7
 This is explained clearly in the 2007 Code’s Explanatory 
Memorandum:  
‘Irrespective of what national law has to say about the relationship between 
international and domestic law, texts put to a referendum must not be contrary 
to international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles 
(democracy, human rights and the rule of law).’8  
In this context it is expected that any referendum will comply fully with established 
international law for good conduct in elections, freedom of expression, the right to 
vote etc. 
 
(ii) International Normative Guidelines and multi-option referendums 
As noted above, there are no provisions in the 2001 Guidelines and the 2007 Code 
directed specifically towards multi-option referendums. We can however draw 
guidance from the general provisions applicable to the setting of referendum 
questions more broadly. An important set of criteria for question-setting is presented 
in the 2001 Guidelines: 
 
Unity of form: texts submitted to referendum have to comply with the principle of 
unity of form, meaning that the same question must not combine a specifically-
worded draft amendment with a generally-worded proposal or a question of principle. 
[Comment: this is a reference to the format of each individual question (see the 
related issue of unity of content below for examples); it does not speak to the 
inclusion of more than one question on the ballot paper.] 
 
Unity of content: by this principle, except in the case of a total revision of the 
constitution or another piece of legislation, there must be an intrinsic connection 
between the various parts of each question put to the vote in order to guarantee 
freedom of suffrage (the voter must not be expected to accept or reject, as a whole, 
provisions without an intrinsic link between them).
9
 [Comment: this is a similar 
                                                 
6
 Venice Commission, ‘Code of Good Practice on Referendums’ Study No 371/2006 (19 March 2007) 
COE Doc CDL-AD(2007)008rev. 
7
  ibid III, 3. 
8
 ibid para 33. The reference to ‘texts put to a referendum’ refer to the question and any other rubric 
appearing on the ballot paper. 
9
 A referendum question proposed in Belarus in 2004 was found to be problematic because it ran two 
issues together as follows: ‘Do you allow the first President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander 
Grigoryevich Lukashenko to participate in the presidential election as a candidate for the post of the 
President of the Republic of Belarus and do you accept Part 1 of Article 81 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Belarus in the wording that follows: “The President shall be elected directly by the people 
of the Republic of Belarus for a term of five years by universal, free, equal, direct and secret ballot?’ 
The Venice Commission was very critical: ‘This combination in a single question of two distinct 
issues, one relating to an individual situation and one proposing a constitutional amendment, is in 
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consideration to unity of form and concerns the internal consistency and coherence of 
each question; again it does not speak to the inclusion of more than one question on 
the ballot paper.
10
] 
 
Unity of hierarchical level: by this principle the same question must not relate 
simultaneously to the constitution and subordinate legislation. 
[Comment: again this speaks to the internal consistency and coherence of each 
question so that each question does not contain two quite separate forms of law.] 
 
Clear and non-leading questions: the question submitted to the electorate must be 
clear (not obscure or ambiguous); it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an 
answer; electors must be informed of the consequences of the referendum, in 
particular of the outcome of Yes or No majorities in response to each question; voters 
must answer the questions asked by yes, no or a blank vote.
11
 
[Comment: this concerns issues of clarity and intelligibility. It does not speak to the 
inclusion of more than one question on the ballot paper except to make clear that each 
question should comply with each of these criteria for clarity etc.] 
 
The 2007 Code largely reiterates the last of these principles, addressing this issue in 
the context of the ‘Freedom of voters to form an opinion’.12 This again emphasises the 
imperative requirement that any question be clear, not misleading etc. 
 
The General Remarks attached to the 2001 Guidelines offer additional detail on how 
the text of a referendum question might be presented:  
‘The text submitted to referendum may be presented in various forms: 
- a specifically-worded draft of a constitutional amendment, legislative enactment or 
other measure 
- repeal of an existing provision 
- a question of principle (for example: “Are you in favour of amending the 
Constitution to introduce a presidential system of government?”) or 
- a concrete proposal, not presented in the form of a specific provision and known as 
a“generally-worded proposal” (for example: “Are you in favour of amending the 
                                                                                                                                            
contradiction with the principle of unity of content as set forth for example in the Guidelines for 
Constitutional Referendums at National Level, adopted by the Venice Commission in July 2001 (CDL-
INF(2001)10, at II.C). Although two questions are put to the voters, they are not allowed to give a 
separate and distinct answer to each of these questions but have to reply in a uniform way.’ 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), 
Opinion on the referendum of 17 October 2004 in Belarus, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
60th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 October 2004). 
10
 There is a reference to multi-option referendums in a Venice Commission Opinion on the draft 
referendum law in Serbia: ‘41. The second paragraph of Article 24 of the draft requires that “if two or 
more questions are subject to voting in the referendum, there shall be different ballots for each 
question”. The principle of unity of content, according to which “there must be an intrinsic connection 
between the various parts of each question put to the vote, in order to guarantee the free suffrage of the 
voter, who must not be called to accept or refuse, as a whole, provisions without an intrinsic link” 
(Code, III.2), is however not expressed explicitly in the law. This would be suitable.’ EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) OPINION ON 
THE DRAFT LAW ON REFERENDUM AND CIVIL INITIATIVE OF SERBIA, CDL-
AD(2010)006, Opinion no. 551 / 2009, Strasbourg, 15 March 2010. The Commission makes no 
comment on the desirability or otherwise of holding different ballots for each referendum question, but 
does emphasise the ‘suitability’ of unity of content in each question asked.  
11
 CDL-INF(2001)010, para. II.E.2.a. See also General Remarks para. II.C. 
12
 2007 Code: I, 3.1 c. 
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Constitution in order to reduce the number of seats in Parliament from 300 to 
200?”).’13  
 
In a speech given by Pierre Garrone, Head of the Division of Elections and Referenda 
Secretariat of the Venice Commission (Council of Europe) this text was repeated. He 
also commented: ‘In most European states which use referenda, votes are possible 
both on specifically-worded drafts and questions of principle or generally-worded 
proposals.’14 Again M. Garrone makes no reference to multi-option referendums as 
instances of either good or bad practice. 
 
(iii) Summary of relevant international guidelines  
 
1. Multi-option referendums are neither expressly endorsed nor objected to by 
the Venice Commission regime. 
 
2. The following international guidelines of good practice should be taken into 
account when setting multi-option referendums questions, as they should when 
setting a binary referendum question: 
 
o the same question must not combine a specifically-worded draft 
amendment with a generally-worded proposal or a question of 
principle; 
o there must be an intrinsic connection between the various parts of each 
question put to the vote; 
o the same question must not relate simultaneously to the constitution 
and subordinate legislation; 
o Each question (and by implication the overall ballot paper in a multi-
option referendum) must be clear and not misleading; 
o Each question (and by implication the overall ballot paper in a multi-
option referendum) must not suggest an answer;  
o Electors must be informed of the effects of the referendum, in 
particular of the outcome of Yes or No majorities in response to each 
question;  
o Voters must be able to answer each question asked solely by yes, no or 
a blank vote. 
 
The text submitted to referendum may be presented in various forms: 
o a specifically-worded draft of a constitutional amendment, legislative 
enactment or other measure 
o repeal of an existing provision 
o a question of principle or 
o a concrete proposal. 
 
4. International Practice: situations where the multi-option referendum has been 
used 
 
(i) A British precedent? 
                                                 
13
 General remarks para. II.C, 2.  
14
 http://www.stjornarskra.is/media/stjornarskra/PG_speech_rev.pdf. 
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In the United Kingdom there has only been one referendum where more than one 
question was asked. This was the 1997 referendum on devolution for Scotland where 
two questions were put to voters. However, this referendum is not what is typically 
understood as a multi-option referendum per the definition in Section 1 above. In 
1997 voters were asked if they agreed or disagreed that there should be a Scottish 
Parliament. In the second question they were asked if they agreed or disagreed that 
the Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers. In the second question voters 
were being offered one specific, additional institutional feature which would 
supplement the one model of self-government on offer in the first question; the 
second question did not in itself offer a second self-standing option of self-
government. This situation can be distinguished from a referendum offering voters 
two distinctive models of self-government – for example, independence and increased 
devolution – as is currently being discussed in the Scottish context.  
 
However, the 1997 referendum may still be relevant when considering the viability of 
a multi-option referendum for the following reasons: first, in terms of structure, the 
referendum was not a simple one question, Yes/No format. Insofar as objections to 
multi-option referendum are based upon the capacity of voters to understand ballot 
design with more than one question, then this model is pertinent. Secondly, voters 
needed to understand that the effect of a majority Yes vote on the second question 
was contingent on a majority Yes vote on the first question.
15
 When it comes to 
‘gateway’ questions ((ii) C. and D. below) this notion of contingency is an important 
element in the design of the ballot. 
  
(ii) Principal models of multi-option referendums 
For precedents of multi-option referendums as defined in Section 1 we need to look 
abroad. I will now set out some of the most important multi-option referendums that 
have taken place around the world over the past century. These can be categorised in 
terms of a number of distinctive models of decision-making. 
 
A. The ‘run-off’ model using two referendums 
 
Newfoundland (1948) A multi-option referendum was used in the process of 
determining the constitutional future of the United Kingdom’s Dominion of 
Newfoundland in 1948. On 3 June voters were offered three options. These were: a 
model of independent territory based upon ‘responsible government’, union with the 
Canadian Confederation, or the status quo (termed ‘Commission of Government’). 
The first option gained 44.6% support, the second 41.1% and the third 14.3%.  
 
This led to a second referendum on 22 July. The two most popular options from the 
first referendum (responsible government and union with the Canadian 
                                                 
15
 Notably Professor Vernon Bogdanor, in his written evidence to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Scottish Affairs, was dismissive of the idea that Scottish voters would not understand a 
three option format: ‘the experience of New Zealand [discussed below] shows that there is no reason 
why the outcome of a multi-option referendum should not be clear-cut, decisive and legitimate. The 
experience of New Zealand also shows that voters are perfectly well able to understand the various 
choices available in a multi-option referendum. There is no reason why Scottish voters should be any 
less sophisticated. It would be patronising to argue otherwise.’ House of Commons Select Committee 
on Scottish Affairs, Report: The Referendum on Separation for Scotland’, HC 1608, 2010-12. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/1608/1608we19.htm 
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Confederation) were offered to voters. The confederation option won by 52.3% to 
47.7%. 
 
Guam (1982) A multi-option referendum was staged in Guam on political status. Six 
options were put before the people. The two most popular options were a 
Commonwealth relationship with the United States (48.5%) and statehood within the 
United States (26%). Only 10% voted to maintain Guam’s status as an unincorporated 
territory. Similar to the model used in Newfoundland a second ‘run-off’ referendum 
was then held pitting Commonwealth status against statehood; 73% voted for the 
former. The United States has failed to implement the referendum result. 
 
B. The plurality model with no ‘50% plus’ majority threshold 
 
By this model the option gaining the largest share of the vote, regardless of its overall 
total, is deemed to have won. 
 
Finland (1931) In Finland a referendum was held on prohibition. It contained three 
options. The polling result was: 70.5% (abolition of prohibition); 28.1% (for 
prohibition); 1.4% (regulation of alcohol content). The decision-making model was a 
plurality one, with the option polling more votes than any other deemed the winner. 
The resounding vote for one option made the result uncontroversial. 
 
Sweden (1957) Sweden has held two notable multi-option referendums. In 1957 an 
advisory referendum concerning a pension scheme was put to the voters. This is 
unusual among multi-option referendums in that, like the Finnish referendum of 1931, 
it did not involve a constitutional issue. Three options were put to the voters resulting 
in the following split in the vote: Option 1: 45.8%, Option 2: 15.0% and Option 3: 
35.3%.  
 
Since no one option polled over 50% there was considerable disagreement and 
confusion over the implications of the vote. It also made it very difficult for the Social 
Democrat-dominated government to implement the first option and it was frustrated 
in these efforts by the second chamber of parliament. Indeed, opponents relied on the 
lack of overall majority support for this option in their refusal to endorse its 
implementation. 
Sweden (1980) On 23 March 1980 another advisory referendum, this time on nuclear 
power, was held in Sweden. Again the ballot contained three options. Each of these 
options was set out in elaborate and detailed ways and the ballot paper as a whole 
could in several respects be considered both confusing and suggestive to citizens. It is 
also the case that two of the options on the ballot were very similar in content to one 
other. On both of these grounds this referendum would seem to fall short of the 
Venice Commission guidelines on question-setting. The results were also very 
inconclusive, with the following split in the vote: Option 1: 18.9%;  Option 2: 39.1%; 
Option 3: 38.7%.  
Cambodia (1960) This again was a plurality referendum offering four choices on 
policy options for the country. The policies of Norodom Sihanouk (who was variously 
King or head of state over a long period of post-war Cambodian history) received 
almost 100% of the vote. This referendum is widely seen as being democratically 
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problematic not so much for its multi-option nature as due to allegations of elite 
manipulation of the campaign and result. 
 
Puerto Rico (1967) is another example of the plurality model. Here a referendum was 
held on the constitutional status of the territory, offering voters three options: 
autonomous commonwealth status, associated with the USA; the possibility of 
becoming a state within the United States constitutional structure; and a form of 
independence. These options polled 60.5%; 38.9%; 0.6% support respectively. The 
first option was taken to be victorious. Unlike the Swedish referendums this outcome 
was relatively uncontroversial with the victorious option polling well over 50% of the 
vote. But in 1993 in another referendum the split was less clear: 48.6% for 
Commonwealth status; 46.3% for statehood within the US and 4.4% for 
independence. More bizarrely, in the last referendum on this issue to date in 1998 
50.3% voted for ‘none of the above’ against four other options of which the only 
significant support was for statehood within the US (46.5%) and independence 
(2.5%). Commonwealth status polled less than 1% after a campaign arguing that the 
way this option was framed was not in the interest of Puerto Ricans and therefore that 
they should vote for the ‘none of the above’ option. 
 
Australia (1977) Here a plebiscite (rather than a referendum as defined by the 
constitution of Australia) was held on the subject of a national anthem. Four choices 
were put to the people and Advance Australia Fair was deemed to have won on the 
basis of a  43% share of the vote (its nearest rival Waltzing Matilda polling 28.2%). 
 
Singapore (1962) Three options were put to the people, each offering different terms 
for a merger with Malaysia. An option proposing merger but retaining elements of 
autonomy won 71% of the vote. Here a threshold was in place, with any measure 
requiring two thirds support to effect constitutional change, so in this sense this was 
not a plurality model in the first past the post sense. The winning option of course met 
this standard. This referendum, like that in Cambodia, was again subject to claims of 
elite manipulation and was widely boycotted.  
 
C. Gateway, Filter and ‘run-off’ model over two referendums 
 
New Zealand (1992-93) The two referendums held in New Zealand in 1992-93 
concerned electoral reform. The model used combined a ‘gateway’ and ‘filter’ multi-
option referendum to narrow down the options, followed by a second ‘run-off’ 
referendum.  
 
First, on 19 September 1992, a non-binding referendum was held asking voters two 
questions. The first ‘gateway’ question asked if they wished to retain the present first 
past the post (FPP) electoral system or if they wanted to change it. 84.7% to 15.3% 
voted in favour of a change to the electoral system. The second ‘filter’ question asked 
which system should replace the present system, offering four options. This 
referendum led to a second, binding, run-off referendum the following year, which 
was held at the same time as the general election of 6 November 1993. It comprised a 
binary choice between the most popular option for change on the second question 
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(Mixed Member Proportional system was the most popular option with 65% of the 
vote) and the status quo. The MMP option won by 53.86% to 46.14%.
16
 
 
New Zealand 2011 New Zealand held another referendum on the voting system in 
2011. It was a similar model to the 1992-93 process but this time the first (and as it 
turned out only) referendum was held at the same time as the general election of that 
year (on Saturday 26 November 2011). Again voters were asked two questions. The 
first gateway question asked if they wanted to keep the Mixed Member Proportional  
voting system or change to another voting system. The second – filter - question 
offered four alternative options. On the first question voters chose to keep the MMP 
voting system by 57.8% to 42.2%. This meant that the result of the second question 
was not taken into account. There was of course no need to plan for a second, run-off 
referendum which was provisionally planned to coincide with the next general 
election which was due by end of January 2015. 
 
D. Gateway and final decision model in one referendum 
 
Puerto Rico 2012 A referendum is planned for 2012 in Puerto Rico on the territory’s 
constitutional status. It is intended that this will coincide with the November general 
election. 
 
The format of the referendum will differ from the 1967 plurality model. It will in fact 
be similar to the New Zealand model in that a first, gateway question will offer voters 
the chance to vote for the status quo (Commonwealth status) or a change in status. A 
second question, the result of which will be taken into account in the event of a 
majority vote for change in the first question, will then offer voters three options for 
change: whether they would prefer a form of independent nation-statehood; the 
possibility of becoming a state within the United States constitutional structure; or 
nationhood in free association with the United States (building on the current 
Commonwealth status). This will again be decided on a plurality model. 
 
There had been initial discussion around having two referendums, again like New 
Zealand – the gateway question in August 2012 followed by a second referendum 
offering three options to coincide with the November elections. Notably this plan did 
not include a filter stage after the gateway stage, narrowing down the three options of 
change leading to a run-off either between the two most favoured or the one most 
favoured and the status quo. In any event the plan changed and it is now intended to 
have both questions on the same ballot in November. One issue here is arguably the 
prejudicing of the status quo. It is possible the commonwealth status could lose 
narrowly to a change in status by a narrow margin but then on the second question a 
model for change could be successful with a smaller percentage of the vote than 
commonwealth status got in the first vote.
17
 
 
                                                 
16
 For an account of these referendums, voting patterns etc. see P. Aimer et al, Toward Consensus?: 
The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand (Auckland UP 1995), chapter 10. 
17
 Rafael Cox-Alomar, ‘Setting the Record Straight on the Puerto Rican Plebiscite’, The Jurist, 7 
March 2012, http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/03/rafael-cox-alomar-status.php There is every likelihood 
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referendum. 
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5. Assessing the different methods of decision-making by way of a multi-option 
referendum 
 
(i) Democratic Standards and the Referendum 
In assessing the democratic merits or demerits of different models of multi-option 
referendum I will turn to the principles of civic participation and deliberative 
democracy which many consider to be essential to referendum good practice. In a 
recent monograph I argued that a referendum is a potentially positive device in 
processes of constitutional change.
18
 This is because the referendum allows citizens to 
be actively engaged in directly determining the fundamental rules by which they will 
be governed. Despite this general predisposition however, I note that referendum 
practice has been plagued with a number of democratic problems including: elite 
manipulation of the referendum process; a lack of deliberation in the process from the 
referendum’s initiation through to the campaign and polling processes; and the risk to 
minority interests of a referendum result which suits the winners but takes no account 
of the interests of those voting for another option(s) and minority interests more 
broadly. I have argued that in order to meet the highest deliberative standards a 
constitutional referendum must: 
(i) facilitate and where possible enhance the active participation of 
citizens throughout the process and not just at the moment of 
voting;  
(ii) facilitate public reasoning; an endeavour which includes providing 
sufficient time and space for reflection on, and discussion of, the 
issues at stake both by political elites and by citizens and civil 
society more broadly. In addition, referendum organisers should 
help facilitate well-informed decision-making by ensuring citizens 
are equipped with objective and non-partisan information 
concerning the issues at stake during the referendum campaign; 
and 
(iii) maximise collective consent among assenters and satisfaction with 
the process among dissenters. To arrive at a conclusive settlement 
of the issue it is important that, on the one hand, efforts are made to 
find a model of constitutional reform that suits a broad plurality of 
citizens rather than a bare majority, and that, on the other, the 
process is seen to be scrupulously open and fair by all participants, 
including those who did not vote for the successful option.  
 
These principles are not specific to the design of multi-option referendums but to 
differing extents they do assist in assessing the merits and demerits of the different 
decision-making models available for multi-option referendums.  
 
(ii) Reviewing the available Models 
 
A. The ‘run-off’ model using two referendums 
From one perspective the two referendum model enhances participation by allowing 
citizens to take part in two separate constitutional events. It can also facilitate a longer 
period of public reasoning by extending the time available for reflection and 
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discussion, as voters have a second referendum to address the issue anew with a 
narrower range of options.  
 
From another perspective there are objections to a two referendum model. The first of 
these is a practical objection. It is expensive to hold a referendum and it may be 
thought too expensive to stage two when the issue can be settled by one referendum. 
In a related way there would be a duplication of the bureaucratic and organisational 
challenges that attend the organisation of any referendum. (Although, one strategy 
used in New Zealand is to combine a second referendum with another election which 
presumably reduces organisational costs.) The second objection, however, concerns 
the deliberative quality of the process itself. Research shows that while public interest 
in constitutional matters can be stimulated by a referendum event, there is a danger 
that citizens will switch off if the process is too long. In its submission to a recent 
House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee Inquiry the Electoral Reform Society 
argued against a two referendum model:  
‘We feel that both questions should be asked on the same day on the same 
ballot paper as there is merit in voters being able to compare three relative 
alternatives at the same time during the same campaign. That said, no method 
of discovering voters’ views is entirely risk free. Although extremely unlikely, 
in our recommended system there could potentially be an outcome where 
people only vote on the first question and hence those voting for a particular 
system are fewer than those who have voted for no change. It will be 
important to advise voters to use both of their votes in this situation. However 
disparity of turnout between two questions is actually more likely should they 
be asked at different times.’19 
 
I offer no comment as to how likely such a ‘deliberation deficit’ would be in the 
Scottish context but if a two referendum model were to be used some thought would 
need to be given as to how voters would react to a such a period of constitutional 
deliberation, whether citizen engagement could be sustained over two referendums, 
whether lower turnout in the second referendum was a significant risk, and whether 
such a model would be preferred by citizens to a one referendum model. Another 
issue is timing. If it is important to reach a decision within a particular time-frame a 
second referendum might be an impediment to this. If a second referendum is held 
very soon after the first there may not be much additional time for further 
deliberation, and so in terms of public reasoning there may not be much value added 
by a second referendum held shortly after the first; although two referendums held 
close together might reduce costs.  
 
B. The plurality model with no ‘50% plus’ majority threshold  
A plurality decision-making approach is rarely taken in referendums today; the most 
recent example of an important state-wide referendum I have found is from Sweden in 
1980. Notably the two Swedish examples I have looked at which use this model were 
advisory in nature and the results served to inform the development of future policy 
rather than to settle the issue. This was also the model used in the three Puerto Rican 
referendums addressed above.  
 
                                                 
19
 House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Report: The Referendum on Separation 
for Scotland’, HC 1608, 2010-12. 
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The Swedish experience in particular suggests that such a model of multi-option 
referendum has clear difficulties. The lack of a requirement that a winning option 
must secure over 50% of the vote led to dissatisfaction in Sweden on the occasions 
where this model was used. That the referendums were advisory in nature also 
enabled opponents of the most popular option to oppose its implementation. Another 
example is the plebiscite on the Australian national anthem.  
 
Of course it might well be asked why referendums cannot be decided on a plurality 
basis when other elections are concluded in this way. Although this is widely accepted 
for the election of officials in first past the post electoral systems, it is widely viewed 
as inappropriate for the making of a major constitutional decisions. The main 
objection would appear to be that referendums, particularly those determining matters 
of the highest constitutional consequence, require a more conclusive result. By the 
third principle I have out-lined above (the conclusive determination of an issue, the 
arrival at an option that enjoys broad plurality support, and the maximisation of 
satisfaction with the process among dissenters), the plurality model would seem to be 
problematic. 
 
Another consequence is that, besides not necessarily delivering over 50% support for 
any one option, this model can result in a very close decision between two or more 
options. For example, in a three option referendum all three could poll approximately 
33% of the vote, or the leading two options could be very close as we saw in Sweden 
in 1980 where they polled very similar results in the high ‘30s (the 1957 referendum 
also had two options polling significant levels of support with no one option over 
50%). The results in Finland 1931 and Puerto Rico in 1967 were of course more 
convincing, but this was a matter of chance, with one of the three options in each case 
happening to poll over 50% of the vote.  
 
If the plurality model were to be used, one rule which might help overcome the 
inconclusive result objection would be to set a 50% plus 1 (or higher) threshold or 
quorum for the success of a winning outcome. We saw this in Singapore in 1962 
where the winning option needed two thirds support to effect constitutional change. 
The issue of thresholds/quora is of course a much broader matter in itself which I do 
not specifically address in this Memorandum. 
 
To summarise, a plural approach to determining the outcome of a multi-option 
referendum concerning major constitutional issues has not been recently used and 
seems to be prey to considerable democratic and practical objections. 
 
C. Gateway, Filter and ‘run-off’ model over two referendums  
As operated in New Zealand this was a three-stage model organised over two 
referendums.  
Stage 1 was a choice between status quo and change. 
Stage 2 was a vote to select one model of change from 4 options. 
Stage 3 was a run-off  in a second referendum between the status quo and the most 
popular option emerging from Stage 2. 
 
This model avoids some of the problems that attend the plurality model and arguably 
also attend the preferential voting and proportional decision-making model (see E. 
below), in that at Stages 1 and 3 over 50% support in a binary vote is needed to be 
 University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/32  
Page 16 of 22 
secured, respectively on the principle of change, and then for a specific model of 
change to be validly endorsed as a replacement for the status quo.  
 
Notably, at Stage 2 in New Zealand 1992 one of the four models itself polled over 
50% of the vote. But it is of course possible that the most popular model at this stage 
will not secure majority support. Such a scenario raises questions as to how legitimate 
this option is as a truly popular alternative to be set against the status quo at Stage 3. 
Arguably these questions are answered at Stage 3 where this model then requires 
majority support vis-à-vis the status quo for its endorsement.  
 
In terms of the principles of citizen participation and deliberation this model has much 
to commend it. As a two referendum model it enhances citizen participation and 
allows more time for deliberation by citizens over the two referendum format. The 
other potentially positive and negative considerations in holding two referendums 
rather that one as discussed in relation to the Newfoundland referendums would again 
apply when considering such a model. 
 
Another important issue is how the different constitutional options to be proposed at 
Stage 2 are arrived at. In New Zealand the referendum was preceded by a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into the Electoral System which helped inform the decision on 
the range of options from which the public were invited to choose.
20
 The role of the 
Royal Commission in drawing up the multiple options to be offered at Stage 2 also 
allowed time for both elite and popular deliberation in this process. The arrival at a 
number of options also gave a plurality of choices for people to choose from, 
minimising the risk that a popular option was missing from the ballot. 
 
From other perspectives there are possible draw-backs. It is notable that in New 
Zealand the second referendum was held over one year after the first. On the one hand 
this allowed more time for deliberation, from another point of view it could be seen as 
an unnecessary delay in arriving at a constitutional decision. Such considerations 
would depend from case to case on the nature of the issue being determined. I have 
noted above the deliberative reasons the Electoral Reform Society gives for preferring 
a one referendum model.  
 
Another possible criticism is the privileging of the status quo in the New Zealand 
model. The status quo was a guaranteed option at Stages 1 and 3; i.e. it was a default 
position at Stage 3 even if it had been heavily defeated at Stage 1. However, in many 
ways this is not unduly surprising. Constitutions tend to operate from the default 
position of stability and many require super-majorities within the institutions of 
government to bring about change. The decision as to whether or not to privilege the 
status quo in a multi-option referendum is one that would again need to be taken from 
system to system based upon various factors including the nature of the issue being 
determined and traditions of constitutional change within a particular constitutional 
system. 
 
Overall the New Zealand model appears to have worked successfully. It is notable 
that when a referendum was held again on the issue of electoral reform in 2011 the 
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people voted to retain the system endorsed by and implemented after the 1993 
referendum. 
 
Of course it would be possible to use this model in the Scottish context. The gateway 
question could lead to a filter question between the two (or more) proposed 
alternatives to the status quo. Rather than accepting that a majority vote for one of 
these options was sufficient ratification of that option, there could be a run off 
between this option and the status quo in due course if this was thought necessary.
21
 It 
is notable, however, that this three stage model was used in the context of four 
alternative proposals to the status quo. It might be argued that two referendums are 
not needed when only two alternatives to the status quo are being deliberated and that 
models A, B and C considered at Section 6 below are more appropriate one 
referendum models for such a scenario. 
 
D. Gateway and final decision model in one referendum 
As observed, the anticipated Puerto Rico 2012 model is similar to New Zealand 
except that it has only two stages and these take place in the same referendum.  
 
Again general debates about the advantages and disadvantages of a one referendum v 
two referendum model, as discussed at A. and C. above apply. 
 
With a one referendum model, and in light of the importance of public reasoning, 
organisers of a referendum need to ask whether they can help ensure sufficient scope 
for deliberation on the different options being offered, and whether they can ensure 
that voters understand the implications of any choice or choices they might make. 
 
One important issue is how well the different options are explained to voters ahead of 
the referendum. This raises issues about the provision of objective information to 
citizens during the campaign etc.  
 
Another broader concern is whether the different options and their constitutional 
implications have themselves been fully worked out. In New Zealand as mentioned a 
Royal Commission was used to set out the different options to be offered in the 
referendum.  
 
As discussed in C. above, it might be argued that a one referendum model is more 
appropriate when only two options beside the status quo are being considered. In the 
New Zealand referendum of 1992 Stage 2 was a filter stage to narrow down the 
alternative options to the status quo (although no such second filter stage is planned 
for Puerto Rico in 2012). It is arguably easier both to explain the different options to 
citizens ahead of a referendum and to arrive at a satisfactory decision-making model 
within one referendum when only two options in addition to the status quo are the 
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subject of the referendum. I will address a series of models at Section 6 as to how a 
one referendum format might work.  
 
E. Preferential voting and proportional decision-making 
This is not a model that has been adopted in any of the examples discussed above, but 
as a possible model of multi-option referendum decision-making it should be 
addressed.  
 
To take one example of a preferential model of multi-option referendum, a decision 
could be arrived at by a form of alternative vote. Voters would be given a list of 
options and asked to rank them. If no option won over 50% of first preference votes 
then second and third preferences could be taken into account. There is of course a 
range of ways in which a particular option could then be deemed to have won. In 
considering such a model it is perhaps relevant that the Scottish electorate is 
accustomed to preferential voting since a single transferable vote applies in local 
government elections. 
 
The viability of such a model would arguably depend to a large extent upon the 
mutual coherence of the different options on offer. Psephologists argue that such a 
model works best where the different options relate to each other on a continuum 
more/less preferable scale rather than an either/or scale. If such a model were to be 
used for a referendum, therefore, there would need to be convincing evidence that the 
options did relate in this way. One difficulty would be if there were options on the 
ballot which a number of voters actively opposed – not wishing even to list these as 
weakest preference - or if popular options were omitted. The latter point is a broader 
issue for referendums in general, as discussed in relation to Singapore in 1962. This 
was also an issue in Australia in 1999 where a referendum offered a binary question 
on the head of state, omitting the option of a directly elected head of state which polls 
later showed would have been more popular than the two options which were offered. 
Arguably giving a ‘none of the above’ option would help surmount the first of these 
difficulties but it would not enhance the notion that the winning option enjoys broad 
plurality support. 
 
Another objection is that the winning option may not have over 50% of first 
preference votes. This could lead to a criticism similar to that levelled at the plural 
voting model above – namely that the result is insufficiently conclusive. On the one 
hand it might be argued that such a model would result in an outcome that enjoys 
broad plurality support; on the other, there is the recurring issue of a major 
constitutional decision being endorsed by fewer than a clear majority of first 
preference votes. What impact would such a result have in terms of satisfaction with 
the process among dissenters?
22
 If it is felt that a referendum on major constitutional 
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change is such a polity-defining process that a majority vote in favour of that option 
needs to be secured to reach a conclusive outcome then this model would seem to be 
lacking.  
 
6. Assessing how a decision might be reached in a three option/two question 
referendum 
 
The New Zealand model was designed for the situation where there are multiple 
alternatives to the status quo. The Puerto Rican scenario proposed for 2012, although 
intended to be settled in one referendum, also contains more than two options in the 
second question.  
 
I will now address how a model might be designed for the situation where, in addition 
to the status quo, only two alternative options are proposed within the referendum. 
 
There are at least three possible ways in which a decision could be reached in a two 
stage referendum. I will assess each of these in line with the democratic criteria used 
in Section 5. I will begin by contrasting the first two of these models: 
 
Model A. The Change/No Change Gateway Model 
Stage 1: a question is posed asking voters if they favour constitutional change or not. 
 
If there is a majority vote for change at Stage 1, the outcome of Stage 2 would apply: 
 
Stage 2: a question is posed asking voters for their preference between two options for 
change. 
 
CONTRAST WITH: 
 
Model B. The ‘Knock-out’ Model  
Stage 1: a question is posed asking voters for their preference between the status quo 
and a first option for constitutional change.  
 
If there is majority support for the model of change proposed at Stage 1 this would be 
considered to be the winning option. If there is majority support for the status quo the 
first option for change is ‘knocked out’ and the result of Stage 2 would apply: 
 
Stage 2: a question is posed asking voters for their preference between the status quo 
and a second option for constitutional change.  
 
In light of the New Zealand experience it can be argued that both Models A and B 
have the potential to arrive at a decisive outcome. In Model A, for an option of 
constitutional change to succeed there would need to be a majority vote for the 
principle of change and then subsequently for a particular model of change. In Model 
B for an option of constitutional change to succeed there would need to be a majority 
vote for such a model either at Stage 1 or Stage 2.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Report: The Referendum on Separation for Scotland’, HC 1608, 
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One criticism of both of these models however is that in each scenario it may not be 
possible to identify a ‘Condorcet winner’ – i.e. an option which is preferred by most 
voters when set against the other options, one by one, in a succession of binary 
questions. In a three option competition for example, Option 1 wins by the Condorcet 
test only if it is preferred to Option 2 in a 1 v 2 question, and to Option 3 in a 1 v 3 
question.
23
 Of course a Condorcet winner is an ideal outcome, and it is not always 
possible to achieve such a result no matter how well a multiple option election of any 
kind is designed. It may simply be that when all three options are set out into three 
binary option groups no one option emerges as more popular each time it is posed 
against another. 
 
Nonetheless, given that it is a way to arrive at a more conclusive decision, maximising 
plural consent, and presumably also satisfaction with the process among dissenters, 
there are ways to try to arrive at a decision that is more likely to be a Condorcet-
compatible outcome. With this criterion in mind we can assess models A and B in 
light of their respective propensity to reach Condorcet compatibility.  
 
To begin, each of the two models A and B leaves a potentially unasked question. In 
Model B, if the option for change offered at Stage 1 is, for example, ‘independence’ 
and this wins over 50%, ‘independence’ would win even though it might come second 
in the Stage 2 process vis-à-vis a second option for change, e.g. some form of 
increased devolution. Therefore, there is a risk, as observed by a number of 
commentators, that the option for change presented in Stage 1 would win even though 
it was a less popular model of change than that presented in Stage 2. This would be 
democratically problematic. The result would arguably not be decisive and it would 
presumably generate considerable levels of losers’ dissent among those who preferred 
the option for change on offer at Stage 2. There is also the issue of how Stage 2 votes 
would be recorded. Either Stage 2 votes would not be recorded in which case many 
people would presumably be dissatisfied if exit polls showed stronger support for the 
Stage 2 option for change, or the data on Stage 2 voting would be released and the 
anomaly between the two outcomes would be fully exposed.  
 
In Model A there is also a risk of Condorcet incompatibility. For example, in the 
event of a majority vote for change at Stage 1, the outcome of Stage 2 would take 
effect. However, it is conceivable that a majority of voters who voted for the principle 
of change at Stage 1 would see a model of change succeed at Stage 2 which if paired 
with the status quo they would have voted against. In other words, a model of change 
would succeed at Stage 2 which would have failed to win in a run off vote with the 
status quo had the model used in New Zealand in 1992-93 been adopted. 
 
However, it also seems to be the case that the risk of Condorcet incompatibility in 
Model A is less significant than in Model B. People with a strongly negative attitude 
towards one of the two available options in Stage 2 can opt for the status quo at Stage 
1. It would also be possible to tell from polling, from sample groups etc., the extent to 
which people view the two models of change on offer at Stage 2 as being in some 
sense preferentially sequential; in other words, the extent to which people whose first 
preference is one of these two models of change state a second preference for the 
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other model of change vis-à-vis the status quo. In the context of the Scottish situation 
in particular, a prominent psephologist Professor Curtice, taking account of polling on 
people’s constitutional preferences, has taken the view that:  
‘A Condorcet winner usually exists when voters’ preferences are arranged 
along a single dimension, such as from left to right. It appears to be the case 
that most voters’ preferences in respect of Scotland’s constitutional future do 
have this character, and that consequently a Condorcet winner probably does 
exist in the form of remaining in the UK but with the Scottish Parliament 
having significantly enhanced powers.’ [It should be noted however that it 
seems to be Professor Curtice’s view that Model B is more likely to deliver a 
Condorcet-compatible model.
24
]  
 
Model C. The Preferential Model 
If it is felt either that the status quo is not being properly respected in either Models A 
or B, or that the mode of decision-making in Model B privileges the first option of 
change, there is a third model available. This poses the same two questions as Model 
B but the mode of determining the result differs: 
 
Stage 1: a question is posed asking voters for their preference between the status quo 
and a first option for constitutional change (Change 1) 
 
Stage 2: a question is posed asking voters for their preference between the status quo 
and a second option for constitutional change (Change 2) 
 
In the event that only one option for change is more popular than the status quo it 
would win; in the event both options for change are more popular than the status quo 
the more popular between these would win.  
 
This would technically leave unanswered the Condorcet issue of the preference of 
voters for Change 1 v Change 2, but this would seem to be answered in all but a 
technical sense by the level of preference each of these generate vis-à-vis the status 
quo.  
 
One difficulty with this model is a risk of tactical voting. Voters who favour a 
particular model of change might elect to vote for the status quo in preference to the 
other model in order to enhance the chances of success for their preferred model of 
change, even though in terms of overall preference, and absent such a ballot process, 
the other model of change would be their second preference. This is a risk but it is 
difficult to see how it is democratically problematic. People feeling sufficiently 
strongly in favour of one model of change are presumably entitled to vote against 
another. 
 
To conclude on the Condorcet point, all three models A-C would ensure that, to be 
successful, a model of constitutional change must win over 50% support in a binary 
vote against either the status quo or another option for change. It seems that models A 
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and C would each be more likely than Model B to arrive at an outcome where it can 
be concluded with reasonable certainty that the winning option is preferred to the two 
other options by a majority of voters. If there is a concern that in Model B the option 
for change offered at Stage 1 is being privileged then Model C would ensure that any 
successful option for change, whichever that may be, is not only favoured by voters 
over the status quo but also receives more votes than the other option for change. In 
Model A a successful option for change would also need to secure more votes than 
the other option for change. 
 
 
